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This paper re-examines the common views that pre-
sidential turnover occurs infrequently, is often the resuit 
of political forces and provides an adéquate measure of 
union democracy. Moreover, the authors try to détermine 
to what extent environmental factors influence annual pre-
sidential turnover rates among Canadian national unions. 
A considérable amount of research has been conducted on union 
government and the nebulous concept of union democracy. The liter-
ature in this field is frequently based on explicit or implicit assumptions 
regarding the stability of union leadership. Throughout thèse works one 
encounters the views, stated with varied degrees of certainty, that: 
(1) there is a very low incidence of turnover among national 
union présidents ; 
(2) turnover, when it does occur, is primarily the resuit of poli-
tical opposition within the union ; 
(3) turnover, however measured, is a gênerai indicator of the 
level of union democracy ; and 
(4) there is a predictable re-
lationship between the 
frequency of turnover 
and such environmental 
factors as union struc-
ture, strike activity and 
économie indicators. 
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The above assumptions can be found in either detailed case 
studies of internai union affairs or in theoretical works on the dimen-
sions of union democracy. The purpose of this study is twofold. First, 
we will re-examine the common views that presidential turnover occurs 
infrequently, is often the resuit of political forces and provides an 
adéquate measure of union democracy. Second, we will develop and 
test hypothèses drawn from studies of union democracy to détermine 
the extent to which environmental factors influence annual presidential 
turnover rates among Canadian national unions. This will be a longi-
tudinal survey covering the period 1912-1971 and the results should 
provide us with a greater understanding of those factors which may 
affect the stability of trade union leadership. 
TURNOVER AND UNION DEMOCRACY 
Students of union government hâve approached the subject of 
union democracy from a number of perspectives.l While some studies 
hâve concentrated on the problems of internai discipline and member-
ship participation, many others hâve stressed the central rôle of union 
élection practices.2 If majority rule is considered to be the cornerstone 
of the unions' claim to democracy3, then concern over the procédures 
and outcomes of union officer élections is understandable. This concern 
is heightened in large labor organizations where union leaders can be 
distinguished from the rank-and-file in terms of skill, status and com-
pensation,4 and seldom face stiff political opposition.5 
1
 While this analysis deals with turnover among the présidents of Canadian na-
tional unions, the analytic framework and hypothèses hâve been drawn largely from 
works in union democracy and government in the United States. This appears justified in 
light of the common collective bargaining traditions in North America and the gênerai 
similarity in union structures and politics. 
2
 For example, élection procédures and the institutionalization of opposition is 
a major thème in Seymour Martin LIPSET, Martin A. TROW and James S. COLEMAN, 
Union Democracy (New York: Doubleday, 1956). Also see Philip TAFT, The Structure 
and Government of Labor Unions (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1962), 
pp. 35-64. 
3
 Alice H. COOK, Union Democracy : Practice and Idéal (Ithaca, N.Y. : Cor-
nell University Press, 1963), p. 20. 
4
 For example, see: LIPSET, TROW and COLEMAN, op. cit., pp. 9-10. 
5
 The infrequency of opposition in union élections has been noted by: TAFT 
op. cit., p. 12; Arnold S. TANNENBAUM, "Unions" in James G. March (éd.) Hand-
book of Organizations (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), p. 745; Derek BOK and John T. 
DUNLOP, Labor and the American Community (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1970), 
p. 73; J. David EDELSTEIN, "An Organizational Theory of Union Democracy", Ame-
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Observers of union democracy appear to hâve acceptée! the view 
that turnover is infrequent among national union leaders. They point 
to the higher rates of turnover experienced by local union officiais 
and the relative ease with which political opposition can be organized 
at the local as opposed to the national level.6 Although turnover 
rates are higher for local union présidents, there is little évidence to 
support the view that turnover of national union présidents is infrequent. 
Indeed, the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics has reported that during 
the period 1961-1970 three-quarters of the national union présidents were 
replaced.7 A similar proportion of turnover has been found among the 
officers of Canadian national unions.8 
There also appears to be a tendency to over-emphasize the im-
portance of political factors, especially élections, as a cause of turn-
rican Sociological Review, v. 32, n. 1 (1967), p. 22; Lois MACDONALD, Leadership 
Dynamics and the Trade Union Leader (New York: New York University Press, 1959), 
pp. 180-115; Woodrow L. GINSBURG "Union Growth, Government and Structure," A 
Review of Industrial Relations Research Volume 1 (Madison, Wis.: IRRA, 1970), p. 242. 
6
 The tenure of the local union leader appears to be considerably less secure 
than that of the national leader and studies hâve indicated that local leader turnover is 
related to the levels of compensation and local size. Moreover, there is some doubt whe-
ther local leader turnover is an indication of union democracy. It may be more of a sha-
ring of leadership tasks and privilèges by a local élite. Arnold S. TANNENBAUM and 
Robert L. KAHN, Participation in Union Locals (Evanston, 111.: Row and Peterson, 
1958), p. 12; Philip TAFT, "Democracy in Trade Unions," Proceedings of the American 
Economie Association, (1946), pp. 362-363; George STRAUSS and Don WILLNER 
"Government Régulation of Local Union Democracy", Labor Law Journal, v. 4, n. 8, 
(August 1953), pp. 250; Léon APPLEBAUM, "Officer Turnover and Salary Structures in 
Local Unions," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, v. 19, (January 1966), pp. 224-
230; Léon APPLEBAUM and Harry R. BLAINE, "Compensation and Turnover of 
Union Officers," Industrial Relations, v. 14, n. 2 (May 1975), pp. 156-157; and Léon 
APPLEBAUM and Harry R. BLAINE, "The Iron Law Revisited: Oligarcy in Trade 
Union Locals," Labor Law Journal, v. 26, n. 9 (September 1975), pp. 597-601. 
7
 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Directory of National 
Unions and Employée Associations, 1971 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1972), p. 51. While élection defeat is rare, there has been a fairly high annual 
turnover rate among the présidents of national unions in the United States. Thèse rates 
are discussed in: Marvin SHOWBARGER and Sam PINTZ, "Landrum-Griffin and 
Union Président Turnover", Industrial Relations, v. 9 (October 1970), p. 475; A Quanta-
tive Appraisal of Présidential Turnover Rates Before and After the Landrum-Griffin Act 
(San José, Cal.: San José State Collège, Institute for Business and Economie Research, 
1970). A comment and updating of the Snowbarger-Pintz analysis is found in: Karen S. 
KOZIARA, "Landrum-Griffin and Union Président Turnover," Industrial Relations, v. 
11, n. 1 (February 1972), p. 118. 
8
 Gary N. CHAISON and Joseph B. ROSE, "Reasons for Turnover Among the 
Présidents of Canadian National Unions", Industrial Relations, v. 16, n. 2, (May 1977). 
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over. We contend that there are three catégories of reasons for vacating 
union office. The first involves élection defeat and is the most closely 
related to the potential for opposition and union democracy. In contrast, 
there are numerous reasons for turnover which are independent of poli-
tical forces, including death in office, retirement because of âge or 
health, and constitutional bars against successive years in office. Finally, 
there exist reasons which are difficult to classify as political or non-
political. For example, some leaders may leave office because the posi-
tion was too onerous or because they désire to work in another posi-
tion in the same or a différent union. Thus, it is necessary to care-
fully differentiate between the stated reasons for turnover and the 
underlying causes. What may initially appear to be voluntary withdrawal 
from union office may actually be a face-saving device employed by 
a vulnérable incumbent leader. 
Reports on the reasons for turnover are limited to American 
unions, but even thèse fail to specify the underlying causes. In the 
period 1969 to 1973, 83 union présidents left office. Only 9 officers 
faced élection defeat whereas many more failed to return for non-
political reasons, e. g., health (11 cases) or limitations on the number 
of terms in office (8 cases). In a large number of instances it is very 
difficult to discern the extent of political motivation. Examples include 
such catégories as résignation or failure to seek re-election (23 cases) 
and retirement (22 cases).9 A study of turnover among the présidents 
of Canadian national unions has revealed that more than half of the 
reasons given for turnover could not be clearly classified as either 
political or non-political.10 Although thèse findings do not provide a 
précise indication of the extent of political vs. non-political turnover, 
they do reveal two things: first, a substantial amount of presidential 
turnover is not politically motivated and second, élection defeats ac-
count for only a small percentage of total turnover. 
It should be further recognized that turnover is not the only nor is 
it necessarily the best indicator of union democracy. Edelstein has 
pointed to other measures of union democracy, e.g., the closeness of 
élections and the degree to which it is produced by formai union 
9
 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Directory of National 
Unions and Employée Associations, 1971 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1972), p. 59; and U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Direc-
tory of National Unions and Employée Associations, 1973 (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Go-
vernment Printing Office, 1974), p. 62. 
10
 CHAISON and ROSE, op. cit. 
AN ANALYSIS OF ANNUAL TURNOVER RATES FOR CANADIAN UNION PRÉSIDENTS 551 
structure and procédures.11 Other writers hâve questioned the gênerai 
relationship of leadership élections to the overall démocratie functioning 
of unions. Faunce states that: 
Rank and file participation in élections and turnover of elected leaders may 
hâve no relevance at ail to union democracy if élections and other formai 
procédures are not important aspects of the control structure of the union.12 
It is also noteworthy that union democracy may be more strongly 
linked to turnover among local rather than national union leadership. 
As Taft has observed : 
One could invoke the long tenure enjoyed by many union officers. It does 
not appear that it indicates the absence of democracy... The most important 
level is likely to be the local union, and members can if they choose 
mount opposition tickets. They can do it on other levels but success in 
those is less likely. ,3 
Consequently, there appear to be some limitations to viewing turnover 
as a measure of democracy at the national union level. 
ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCE ON TURNOVER 
Research on union democracy suggests that the frequency of 
politically-motivated turnover will vary over time in relation to measures 
of union structure, strike activity and économie activity. In this 
analysis, we shall explore and evaluate the ability of thèse broad 
measures to explain the variance in annual rates of aggregate presidential 
turnover. The measure of presidential turnover (PT) is discussed in a 
later section. Below is a brief description of the environmental variables 
and the hypothèses to be tested. 
Union Membershlp and Structure (UMN, AMNL) 
The growth of a union can enhance the power of an incumbent 
leader while increasing the barriers to effective political opposition. 
This size factor has been noted by Lipset, Trow and Coleman: 
11
 EDELSTEIN, op. cit., passim., "Democracy in a National Union: The Bri-
tish AEU," Industrial Relations, v. 4, n. 3 (May 1965), pp. 105-125. 
12
 William A. FAUNCE, "Size of Locals and Union Democracy," American 
Journal ofSociology, v. 68, n. 3 (November 1962), p. 297. 
13
 Philip TAFT, "Internai Union Structure and Functions," in Gerald Somers 
(éd.) The Next Twenty-Five Years of Industrial Relations (Madison, Wis.: IRRA, 1973), 
p. 7. Also see Footnote 6, supra. 
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The smaller the political unit, the greater the possibility of démocratie 
control. Increased size necessarily involves the délégation of political power 
to professional rulers and the growth of bureaucratie institutions. The smaller 
the association or unit, the greater membership control. There can be little 
doubt that this is so in the trade union movement.14 
In other words, as national unions increase in size, the gulf between 
leaders and members is likely to expand. This enables union officiais 
in large-scale organizations to control the formai means of com-
munication and maintain an almost complète monopoly over political 
skills. As a resuit, formai opposition has little opportunity to develop 
and the likelihood of politically motivated turnover is minimized.15 
Studies of turnover rates in the United States hâve described the 
effect of union size on turnover. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
found that in the period 1971-1973, 16 of the 36 unions which 
experienced presidential turnover had fewer than 10,000 members while 
25 had fewer than 100,000 members.16 Moreover, this source reported 
previously that, "death and retirement, rather than incumbent oppo-
sition, resulted in the great majority of turnover of présidents in the 
largest unions."17 Koziara's findings also stress the importance of size; 
between 1968-1969 the presidential turnover rate for larger unions 
(100,000 or more members) was 26.7 percent compared with 34.4 per-
cent for smaller unions (less than 100,000 members).18 
14
 LIPSET, TROW and COLEMAN, op. cit., p. 14. 
15
 The influence of union size on leadership control, centralized structure, the 
émergence of staff specialists and the difficultés faced by opposition movements is dis-
cussed in: LIPSET, TROW and COLEMAN, op. cit., passim; J. SEIDMAN, Demo-
cracy in the Labor Movement (Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press, 1958), pp. 10-11. 
Seymour Martin LIPSET, "The Political Process in Trade Unions: A Theoretical State-
ment", in Walter Galenson and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.) Labor and Trade Unionism 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), passim. ; William HERBERG, "Bureaucracy 
and Democracy in Labor Unions", in Joseph Shister (éd.) Readings in Labor Economies 
and Industrial Relations (Chicago: J. B. Lippincott, 1951), pp. 99-107; John R. COLE-
MAN, "The Compulsive Pressures of Democracy in Unionism", The American Journal 
of Sociology, v. 61, n. 6 (May 1956), pp. 519-526; Emanuel STEIN, "The Dilemma of 
Union Democracy," in Richard A. Lester (éd.), Labor: Readings on Major Issues (New 
York: Random House, 1967), pp. 185-195. Many of thèse works are based upon the 
concepts developed in Michel's "iron law of oligarcy". Robert MICHELS, Political Par-
ties (Glencove, 111. : The Free Press, 1958). 
16
 U.S. Department of Labor, BLS, Directory of National Unions and Em-
ployée Associations, 1973, op. cit., p. 62. 
17
 "Tenure of Union Officers", Monthly Labor Review, v. 92, n. 2 (February, 
1971), p. 62. 
18
 KOZIARA, op. cit., p. 119. 
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As the Canadian labour movement expands over time, we would 
expect a commensurate increase in the size of the average national 
union. Therefore, it is hypothesized that the annual rate of presidential 
turnover will be negatively related to increases in total union member-
ship.19 The variable UMN dénotes the total membership of those 
Canadian national unions for which the présence or absence of turnover 
could be determined. 
Increases in membership among national unions can be achieved 
through the expansion of existing locals or the création of new ones. If 
union growth is achieved primarily through the expansion of existing 
locals, this may counter the predicted négative effect of union size on 
turnover rates. In many ways, the leaders of large local unions enjoy 
the same advantages as national leaders, although not to the same 
extent. For example, a number of studies hâve shown that the leaders of 
large local unions are more secure in their positions than officers in 
smaller locals. This greater stability can lead to national prestige, the 
development of political skills and the establishment of an organized 
opposition strong enough to challenge the national leadership.20 As 
Faunce notes, large locals are a more significant force for democracy in 
the national union primarily because they are less dépendent on the 
national office and therefore in a better position to express opposition 
to it.21 
In which direction, then, has union growth occurred? Tannenbaum 
emphasizes the création of new locals. 
The growth of national unions has occurred largely through the addition of 
new locals rather than through increasing the size of existing locals, so that 
the net effect of growth has militated in the direction of a larger number of 
small unions dépendent upon the national.22 
While this may be the case in the United States, it remains to be seen 
if it applies to the growth of Canadian unions. Based on the foregoing, 
19
 It is assumed that as total union membership increases, unions in gênerai will 
also increase in size. In other words, the gains in membership will not be completely 
offset by the création of new Canadian national unions. The average union size was not 
used as a union structure variable because of the extrême variation in union size in Ca-
nada. 
20
 FAUNCE, op. cit. passim. Also see L. APPLEBAUM and H. R. BLAINE, 
"Compensation and Turnover of Union Officers", op. cit., pp. 156-157; A. S. TAN-
NENBAUM, op. cit., pp. 754-755. 
21
 FAUNCE, op. cit., p. 291. 
22
 TANNENBAUM, op. cit., p. 755. 
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it is hypothesized that there wili be a positive relationship between an-
nual presidential turnover and the average size of locals. The variable 
AMNL dénotes the average annual membership per national union lo-
cal for those unions in which turnover could be determined.23 
Measures of Turbulence or Crises 
Incumbent leadership is often faced with its most serious challen-
ges in times of turbulence or crises. Lipset points out that such crises 
as shifts in the business cycle or prolonged strikes may cause the lea-
dership to make major policy décisions and reverse traditional practi-
ces. 
The conséquence may be the loss of relative position or privilège by one 
section of the union comparée! with another or perhaps a loss in économie 
position for the entire union. A major shift in policy may upset the support 
for a given leader among the rank and file and among sections of union 
officialdom.24 
Accordingly, crises may alter stable internai relations and erode rank-
and-file support for the incumbent. Under such circumstances, subor-
dinate officiais may émerge and challenge the existing leadership's abi-
lity to manage union affairs.25 
Strike Activity (NS, TL) 
It could be hypothesized that measures of strike activity would be 
positively and significantly related to annual turnover rates. Intense or 
widespread strike activity might appear to serve as a convenient and 
adéquate measure of turbulence or crises of the form discussed above. 
However, we believe that annual strike indices are too broad to be di-
rectly linked to serious political challenges to incumbent leaders. Firs-
tly, the use of aggregate strike measures prevents us from determining 
if strike activity was evenly distributed among the national unions or 
whether a few unions accounted for a disproportionate share. In addi-
tion, it remains unclear whether greater stress would be felt at the na-
tional or local level. The fact that collective bargaining is decentralized 
in Canada and local unions are responsible for strike décisions, sug-
gests that local présidents may be more vulnérable to thèse crises than 
23
 The time séries for UMN and AMNL were extracted from: Canada Depar-
tment of Labour, Labour Organizations in Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1911-
1972). 
24
 LIPSET, op. cit., p. 230. 
25
 Ibid., pp. 230-231. 
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national leaders. Another shortcoming of aggregate strike measures is 
their failure to distinguish among the causes of industrial conflict. A si-
gnificant number of strikes prior to World War II were recognitional 
disputes rather than "économie" strikes. There may well be a positive 
corrélation between the underlying causes of strike activity and leader-
ship stability. 
Two frequently used measures of strike activity hâve been inclu-
ded in this analysis.26 Time lost due to strikes as a proportion of total 
time worked (TL) indicates the intensity and économie impact of work 
stoppages. The number of strikes per one million members of the la-
bour force (NS) measures the widespread nature of industrial 
conflict.27 Both TL and NS will be lagged one year behind PT to indi-
cate the relationship between turnover and the strike activity of the 
immediately preceding period. We hypothesize that TL and NS, be-
cause of their limitations as measures of stress or crises faced by na-
tional union leadership in gênerai, will not be significantly related to 
annual turnover rates. Economie Activity (P,Y). Seidman has suggested 
that many union members are primarily concerned with économie 
benefits rather than with internai union politics, and would support the 
incumbent union administration provided it secured satisfactory gains 
in wages and fringe benefits.28 Furthermore, a leader's tenure in office 
may dépend largely on his ability to match or exceed the collective bar-
gaining gains of rival unions.29 If leadership performance is judged 
from an économie perspective, then the task of satisfying members' 
expectations may be more difficult during periods of rapidly rising pri-
ées. In Une with this reasoning, Koziara states that the increased presi-
dential turnover rates during 1968-1969 in the United States may hâve 
partly resulted from dissatisfaction with escalating priées.30 
26
 A discussion of the meaning of the selected strike measures is found in : John 
VANDERKAMP, "Economie Activity and Strikes in Canada," Industrial Relations, v. 
9, n. 2 (February 1970), p. 221. 
27
 The data source for the variables TL, NS is: Labour Canada, Strikes and 
Lockouts in Canada, 1972 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974), pp. 28-29; and VAN-
DERKAMP, op. cit., p. 29. 
28
 Joël SEIDMAN, "Some Requirements for Union Democracy", in Richard A. 
Lester (éd.), Labor: Readings on Major Issues (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 
168. 
29
 See, for example, Ibid., p. 163. 
20
 KOZIARA, op. cit., p. 119. This finding is disputed by Marvin SNOWBAR-
GER, "Reply to Professor Koziara", Industrial Relations, v. 11, n. 1 (February 1972), p. 
120. 
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It has also been claimed that the business cycle may be related to 
leadership turnover. Lipset has stated that shifts in the business cycle 
(another "crisis" variable) could produce leadership changes because 
of the réduction in wages and the weakening of the union through 
unemployment of its members.31 Swindinsky's study of union growth 
in Canada also suggests a relationship between the business cycle and 
the member's perception of his organization (and presumably its lea-
ders) : 
The benefits of union membership are likely to be assessed more favourably 
during the expansionary phase of the business cycle when unemployment is 
low and an increased number of workers might feel that union membership 
yields a positive net benefit.32 
The rate of price increases is measured by the annual Consumer 
Price Index (P).33 The business cycle fluctuation (Y) is represented by 
the Gross National Product per capita as a percent of a log linear 
trend.34 It is hypothesized that Y will be negatively related to annual 
turnover while P will be positively related. The time séries for Y and P 
will be lagged to indicate the relationship between turnover and the 
économie activity of the preceding year. 
THE ANNUAL PRESIDENTIAL TURNOVER RATE 
Development of the Time Séries 
Published annual indices are available for the selected measures 
of union structure, strike activity and économie activity. In contrast, 
the annual rate of presidential turnover (PT) for Canadian national 
unions had not been previously calculated. For the purpose of this 
study a time séries of PT was derived from information contained in 
Labour Organizations in Canada, published by the Canada Department 
of Labour.35 Lists of présidents and their unions were compiled begin-
21
 LIPSET, op. cit., p. 230. 
22
 R. SWINDINSKY, "Trade Union Growth in Canada 1911-1970", Relations 
Industrielles-Industrial Relations, v. 29, n. 3 (1974), p. 440. 
33
 The data source for the variable P is: VANDERKAMP, op. cit., pp. 29-30; 
and Statistics Canada, Canadian Statistical Review, Historical Summary, 1970 (Ottawa: 
Statistics Canada, 1971) (Cat. 11-505), Section 5, p. 68. The base year is 1957. 
34
 The data source for the variable Y is: O. J. FIRESTONE, Industry and Edu-
cation: A Century of Canadian Development (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1969), 
pp. 262-263; Statistics Canada, Canada Yearbook, 1974 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 
1974), Table 21.1. The base year is 1957. 
35
 Canada Department of Labour, Labour Organizations in Canada, op. cit. 
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ning with the first édition of this annual directory in 1911. When the 
name of a union's président failed to match that of the prior year, the 
case was recorded as one of turnover.36 The spécifie reasons for tur-
nover were not identified. The annual rate of turnover was computed 
for a sixty-year period (1912-1971), but data for 1941-1943 were unavai-
lable because the names of présidents were not published during those 
years.37 
For the period under considération, the identities of 241 unions 
were recorded along with the names of 718 individual union présidents. 
In 2,104 of the total 2,526 cases it was possible to détermine whether 
or not presidential turnover occurred. Among the principal reasons for 
coding a case "turnover can not be determined" were the listing of a 
union for the first time or the occasional failure to list a président's 
name. 
The Trend in Turnover Rates 
The trend in annual presidential turnover rates is presented in Fi-
gure 1. The annual rates were very erratic in the pre-World War II pe-
riod with wide fluctuations from 1912 to about 1930. From 1912 to 1919 
the average annual turnover rate was 33.7 percent. The corresponding 
figure for the following décade was 37.6 percent. In the 1930's a decli-
ning but still widely fluctuating trend was found and the average turno-
ver rate for that décade fell to 24.3 percent. In the 1940's, the average 
rate increased to 31.5 percent, but this is largely attributed to the very 
high rate (51.5 percent) found in 1944. Thèse figures might suggest that 
turnover was relatively higher during the early wartime period. Howe-
ver, this conclusion cannot be confirmed because of the three-year gap 
in the time séries. The 1950's and i960's were marked by generally de-
clining turnover rates (24.2 percent and 21.8 percent, respectively). For 
the entire sixty-year period a widely fluctuating but generally declining 
trend in annual turnover rates is apparent. 
36
 It should be noted that this procédure does not permit the recording of more 
than one case of presidential turnover per year. It was assumed that this was very unli-
kely to occur. Moreover, when a union ceases to be listed after a merger, there is no 
means to record any resulting presidential turnover for that union. 
37
 While a turnover rate could be calculated for the entire three-year gap, there 
is no means to détermine the annual turnover rate. Furthermore, if there was more than 
one case of presidential turnover for a union during the three years, this would not be 
indicated by comparing the name of the président in 1944 with that of 1940. 
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FIGURE I 
Annual Presidential Turnover Rates 
of Canadian National Unions 
(1912-1940, 1944-1971) 
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SOURCE: Canada Department of Labour, Labour Organizations in Canada, (Ottawa: 
Information Canada, 1911-1972). 
The downward trend presented in Figure 1 might be interpretated 
as confirming the view that union leadership follows a recognizable pat-
tern of évolution. Barbash has observed that initially union leadership 
struggles with the problems of organizing workers and collective bar-
gaining, and there is little time for internai conflict or factionalism. In a 
later stage, attention shifts toward control of internai union matters and 
contests for union office develop. In the final stage, the dominant group 
of leaders establishes itself and becomes increasingly difficult to unseat. 
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While there may be a lack of conformity in the time span of this évolu-
tion, it is believed that the leaders of older unions will fall into the later 
stages of development.38 It should be recognized, however, that 
controls on union identity were not exercised and therefore it is not 
possible to confirm Barbash's views. As new unions were formed in 
différent periods and old ones were dissolved or merged into others, 
the composition of the sample changed over time. The total number of 
unions contained in the study is 241, but the number appearing in the 
annual tabulations range from 8 in 1912 to 63 in 1971.39 In earlier years 
as well as later ones, the sampled unions could be at any of the stages 
of évolution.40 
Data Analysis 
The research literature on union democracy and government has 
suggested that the stability of union leaders will be affected in a predic-
table manner by aspects of union structure, strike activity and écono-
mie activity. This has enabled us to hypothesize that spécifie rela-
tionships would be found in a longitudinal analysis of annual turnover 
rates. The strength and direction of thèse relationships is examined by 
using multiple régression analysis for ail of the independent variables. 
A stepwise procédure is used to arrive at a multiple régression équation 
containing the six independent variables. Thèse variables were entered 
into the équation in the order of their présentation in this paper rather 
than any spécifie order of inclusion which would assume cause and ef-
fect relationships. Low default limits were set to insure the inclusion of 
ail variables in the équation. 
38
 Jack BARBASH, Labor Unions in Action (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1948), p. 200. It has also been suggested that the "career union leader" is most likely to 
be found in the long established union, while the "ideological" leader, less concerned 
with tenure, would be found in the younger union. LIPSET, op. cit., p. 233. VanTine, in 
his study of the development of the labour bureaucrat in the United States, also suggests 
that length of tenure in union office is proportional to the length of time the union has 
been in existence. William R. VANTINE, The Making of the labor Bureaucrat (Amherst, 
Mass. : University of Massachusetts Press, 1973), p. 30. 
39
 Thèse figures refer to the number of cases in which it could be determined 
whether or not there was turnover. 
40
 In addition, some unions, such as public or professional employée associa-
tions, could hâve been in existence for a considérable amount of time before being listed 
in Labour Organizations in Canada. 
TABLE I 
Multiple régression results 
Régression Equation : 
PTT = -1.3486 - .0621 UMN + .0068 AMNL + 0106 NS T - i + 6.3754 TL T _, 
(2.4931)*** (.1261) (.7274) (.5455) 
r2 = .31 
F = 3.6279*** 
Corrélation Coeficients 
Variable Multiple r2 r2 change 
UMN .17 .17 
AMNL .18 .01 
NS T _! .19 .01 
TL-r-i .21 .02 
Y T _, .24 .03 
P T _ , -31 .07 
(t values are in parenthesis) 
*** Significant at the .01 level. 
** Significant at the .05 level. 
* Significant at the .10 level. 
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The régression results are presented in Table I. The overall équa-
tion is statistically significant at the .01 level and accounts for almost a 
third of the variance in PT. 
As hypothesized, a significant négative relationship exists between 
UMN and PT (at the .01 level). Apparently, a réduction in turnover 
coincides with overall union growth, a finding which supports the wi-
dely held belief that as unions in gênerai become larger the frequency 
of presidential turnover déclines. When we consider that the présidents 
of large national unions are less likely to encounter political opposition, 
and that the attributes of their jobs, e.g., financial rémunération and 
status, mitigate against them voluntarily leaving office, it is hardly sur-
prising that thèse leaders enjoy longer tenure. 
It was also hypothesized that AMNL would be positively related 
to PT. This was based on the notion that when union growth occurs 
primarily through the expansion of existing locals, local leaders will be 
in a better position to challenge national officers. Our findings reveal 
there is no statiscally significant relationship between PT and AMNL, 
and that the direction of the relationship is négative rather than positive 
as we hypothesized. It is suggested that a growth in total membership 
is followed by a corresponding growth in both the number of locals and 
an increase in average local size. One possible explanation for the ab-
sence of a positive relationship between the dépendent and independent 
variable is that membership gains may hâve been distributed between 
new and old locals in such a way that the relative position of large and 
small locals within the national remained unchanged. It should also be 
noted that the positive relationship between thèse two independent va-
riables and their order of entry into the équation may hâve minimized 
the contribution of AMNL to the variance in PT. The simple r2 for 
UMN is .17; the corresponding figure for AMNL is .16. However, 
UMN was entered first in the équation and UMN and AMNL are posi-
tively interrelated. Thus, the addition of AMNL to the équation resul-
ted in a change in the overall r2 of only .01. 
It was hypothesized that the two measures of strike activity 
(NST- I and T L T - 0 would not be significantly related to PT. It was be-
lieved that thèse strike indices, (though common measures of strike ac-
tivity), were inadéquate indicators of crises faced by national union 
leaders in gênerai. The régression results support our hypothesis. A si-
gnificant trend could not be undercovered for the two strike measures 
and the inclusion of N S T - I and T L T - I in the équation resulted in 
changes in the r2 of only .01 and .02, respectively. Examination of the 
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simple r2 for both variables indicates that each considered alone would 
account for little variance in PT. 
The two measures of économie activity were hypothesized to be 
significantly related to PT. It was predicted that union leadership would 
encounter the most serious crises soon after both downswing in the bu-
siness cycle and rises in price levels. The inclusion of Y T - I and P T - I 
in the équation resulted in an r2 change of .10, most of which (.07) is 
attributable to P-r-i- As predicted, turnover was greatest during periods 
of rapid price rises. As noted earlier, it would be during thèse periods 
that membership expectations would be highest and the collective bar-
gaining gains of the leadership would be most critically evaluated. Ho-
wever, it was also found that leadership stability was greater during 
downturns in the business cycle. It may well be that the subset of éco-
nomie variables are related to différent forms of presidential turnover. 
Weaker officers might face serious political challenges soon after 
periods of rapid price rises whereas well entrenchend présidents vacate 
office for non-political reasons, e.g., retirement, when économie condi-
tions are good. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has examined turnover of Canadian national union 
présidents during the period 1912-1971. In the first part of the paper we 
reviewed some common assumptions about the frequency and causes 
of turnover, as well as the link between turnover and union democracy. 
The analysis then considered the relationship between annual changes 
in aggregate presidential turnover and union structure, strike activity 
and économie indicators. 
Many of the hypothesized relationships were supported by the ré-
gression results. In accordance with earlier findings, union growth ap-
pears to hâve increased the ability (or désire) of présidents to remain in 
office. While union growth was accompanied by increases in average 
local size, this change was not found to be significantly related to pre-
sidential turnover. 
Two subsets of variables were used to measure crises or turbu-
lence which could affect leadership stability. Emphasis was placed on 
the serious limitations of aggregate strike measures as indicators of cri-
ses. As hypothesized neither strike measure was significantly related to 
turnover rates. On the other hand, significant relationships were found 
for both measures of économie activity. Turnover rates were positively 
correlated with shifts in the business cycle and price changes. 
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The ability to generalize from thèse results is limited to some de-
gree by our measure of turnover and because our hypothèses were ba-
sed on micro-level studies. As noted earlier, some cases of presidential 
turnover may be independent of political factors and it may be extre-
mely difficult to differentiate between political and non-political turno-
ver except in such cases as death in office, retirement because of âge 
or health, and élection defeat. It may well be that a very large propor-
tion of the cases of turnover were non-political and independent of the 
measures of union structure, strike activity and économie activity. 
Some support for this view is found in the relatively low explanatory 
power of the three classes of independent variables. The overall régres-
sion équation can explain less that one third of the variance in the an-
nual turnover rates. 
The results of this study hâve pointed to some factors underlying 
the gênerai décline in turnover rates among national union leaders. A 
more direct measure of strike activity remains to be developed before 
we can fully explore the link between this form of crisis and turnover. 
In addition, the explanatory power of the régression équation would 
hâve been enhanced if some means were devised to isolate that propor-
tion of annual turnover caused by internai union poli tics. This study 
has been conducted as both a test of and supplément to the large body 
of primarily theoretical research and case studies of aspects of union 
government. It is hoped that future works in this area will explore the 
research questions posed in this analysis. 
Taux de roulement des présidents de syndicats canadiens 
On a fait beaucoup de recherches sur la direction des syndicats et le concept 
fumeux de la démocratie syndicale. Les études en la matière portent sur le postulat 
explicite ou implicite de la stabilité de la direction des centrales syndicales au Canada. 
De ces travaux, on tire généralement des conclusions d'une certitude plus ou moins as-
surée. 
C'est ainsi qu'on soutiendra qu'il n'y a que peu de roulement parmi les présidents 
des centrales canadiennes, que ce roulement, lorsqu'il advient, résulte d'oppositions à 
l'intérieur du syndicat, qu'il est un bon indicateur du degré de démocratie syndicale et 
qu'il y a une relation entre le taux de fréquence du roulement et certains facteurs am-
biants comme la structure du syndicat, l'action de grève et la situation économique. 
On retrouve de telles hypothèses tant dans des études de cas sur l'activité interne 
des syndicats que dans des travaux théoriques sur la démocratie syndicale. 
L'article précédent étudie de nouveau l'affirmation selon laquelle le renverse-
ment des présidents est plutôt rare, qu'il est souvent la résultante de forces politiques 
et qu'il est une mesure valable de la démocratie syndicale. En outre, il expose et vérifie 
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les postulats qu'on a tirés de ces études pour déterminer dans quelle mesure les fac-
teurs ambiants ont pu avoir d'influence sur le taux de changement de présidents dans les 
syndicats canadiens. L'étude porte sur une très longue période, c'est-à-dire de 1912 à 
1971, et les résultats permettent de mieux comprendre les facteurs qui peuvent exercer 
une influence sur la stabilité de la direction des syndicats. 
De cette étude, sont tirées les conclusions suivantes. On note que la croissance 
du syndicat semble être une motivation de la capacité et du désir des présidents de 
demeurer en poste et que celle-ci n'a pas d'incidence marquée sur les changements de 
président. Le recours à la grève ne paraît pas non plus jouer un rôle majeur dans le 
renversement ou le départ des présidents. L'activité économique, par ailleurs, est plus 
déterminante, les mutations coïncidant avec les changements de cycles économiques et de 
variations dans les prix. 
Un certain nombre de changements ne sont pas attribuables à des facteurs poli-
tiques. Aussi, est-il extrêmement difficile de distinguer entre un changement qui est 
d'ordre politique et un autre qui ne l'est pas, sauf en certains très précis comme la 
mort pendant la durée du mandat, la prise de la retraite en raison de l'âge et une défaite 
électorale. Il se peut fort bien qu'une très forte proportion des cas de départ n'aient rien 
à voir avec les modifications des structures syndicales, l'activité de grève ou la situation 
économique. 
Dans l'ensemble, les résultats de l'étude tendent à indiquer un certain déclin dans 
le taux de roulement des présidents de syndicat. Reste à faire une analyse plus appro-
fondie du rapport entre l'activité de grève et le taux de roulement et il est souhaitable 
que de nouveaux travaux contribuent à résoudre les questions que pose la présente 
analyse. 
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